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or
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I.

INTRODUCTION;
A.

THE TAKINGS JUNKYARD

The character of state/local resource regulations:

a

lightening overview.
Run-of-the mill takings cases have historically arisen
from the exceedingly pedestrian circumstances of local
regulation.

The doctrine is a well-known morass, which scholars

periodically vow to clean up, more or less fruitlessly

B.

Federal judicial reactions
For many years, higher-level federal courts left

state/local takings issues alone, and major takings issues were
left to be hashed out in the states.

In recent years this

pattern has changed, with a flurry of new Supreme Court takings
cases.

C.

The Federal regulatory dimension
A somewhat less noted phenomenon has been increased
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federal judicial "takings" supervision over federal legislation
as well as state and local.

D.

Some questions posed:
1)

What are the sources of new activism?

2)

Are the "takings" cases in the context of federal

legislation simply deja vu, or a new departure?

II.

SOURCES AND HISTORY
A.

"Takings” and property regimes.

"Takings" cases and doctrines have to be understood in
relationship to underlying theories of property.

B.

Why have property?

Three major theories of property are, roughly speaking,
libertarian, civic republican and utilitarian.

I will

concentrate on utilitarian views, since I think these dominate
much of our law and thinking about property.

C.

Implications of utilitarian property
1)

Property as an institution encourages investment

and careful use of resources, but this means that property rights
should be relatively stable.
2)

Property rights are not always well-defined, with

the result that property uses sometimes cause externalities or
spillover effects.

Regulation is ofen justified as preventing
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externalities, or in older parlance, preserving "public rights."
Externalities take several forms; the most important for
regulation are common pool externalities.

D.

The evolutionary character of property rights &
regulatory regimes
Property rights tend to evolve from less-defined to

more sharply-defined as resources grow scarcer; the regulation of
externalities also evolves, and in a similar pattern.

III.

REGULATION, PUBLIC RIGHTS AND "TAKINGS" PROBLEMS
A.

Practical problems in regulation
1.

The usual stuff:

Regulators may have dumb ideas,

or take graft, or get "captured" by the regulated entities.
2.

The "piggy-back commons problem":

uses of property

may use common resources in ways that cause external harms to
others (e.g. smoking, waste disposal in air or water), but by the
time these are noticed as problems, property-owners think that
their property rights include the infliction of externalities on
others.

Hence regulation faces the obstacles of entrenched

entitlements; the purported baseline property right includes a
piggy-backed externality.
3.

The uncertain hopes of planning:

Advance planning

is often cited as an antidote to entrenchment, by signalling that
particular property uses may be subject to regulation in the
future; but planning may or may not work to give the proper
3

signals.

B.

Regulating the regulators— another evolutionary process.
Regulation may have external effects or other

problematic effects of its own (e.g. exclusionary zoning or NIMBY
regulation may cause external harms to neighboring communities).
Hence regulatory activities too may require supervision, just as
property owners' uses require supervision by regulation.

C.

The Federal courts and the evolution of "regulating the
regulators”— judicial supervision in context.
There are a number of institutions that have policed or

supervised local and state regulatory bodies— notably state
courts and state legislation.

Perhaps for this reason, federal

judicial supervision was very low-key for a number of years, but
now has staged a great resurgence with the recent flurry of
Supreme Court takings cases.

The larger context of "regulating

the regulators," however, also includes federal legislative
supervision of state and local measures, e.g. in the major air
and water pollution control acts.

IV.

"TAKINGS" CLAIMS AGAINST FEDERAL ACTIONS
A.

The great scope of federal resource management
Federal legislative resource management has been

important in the public lands for many years, but particularly in
recent years, with the turn to conservationist approaches.
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Federal legislation has also massively entered resource
management through other routes, e.g. legislation for pollution
control, mining regulation, wildlife management etc.

B.

New role of the Federal claims court:
As federal resource management has expanded, takings

challenges against the federal government have centered on the
federal court of claims.
1.

familiar substantive claims

Claims court cases have a familiar substantive base,
and tend to revolve around land uses— e.g. challenges to
regulations about mining, wetlands, wildlife habitat.

Like the

subjects of state/local regulation, land uses subject to federal
legislation also frequently involve a "piggy-backed" common
resource (air, water, wildlife) associated with the land use.
2.

unfamiliar institutional character

Institutionally, the takings claims against federal
legislation are quite different.

Congress is very large and

diverse, by comparison with local or even state legislative
bodies, and should have different institutional strengths and
weaknesses.

E.G., Congress may be able to marshall more

investigative resources and scientific sophisticaton than state
and local bodies.

But since there are many states and

localities, citizens have more choice among legislative
"packages” at the state or local level.

"Capture" as a problem

thus might take on different characteristics as between federal
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or state/local legislatures.

C.

Do the feds need a different kind of takings discussion?
The above issues suggest that "takings" challenges to

federal legislation might best analysed in a different way from
state or local legislation; but the claims court to date appears
not to have provided any such analysis.

V.

CONCLUSION
1)

Federal legislative and judicial supervision over

state/local legislation was predictable from the evolution of
property rights and regulations
2)

Federal judicial supervision over federal legislation

perhaps also predictable, given the massive federal entry into
resource management
3)

But federal legislation emerges from a quite different

institutional setting from state/local regulation, and those
differences call for independent consideration, and perhaps a
different takings jurisprudence— something we may not get, in any
systematic way, from an Article I court.
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